With rapid growth of Internet technologies, more and more servers provide different resources to be accessed over the open network. For most of the resources provided by remote servers, users must pass an authentication procedure in order to access data. But most conventional password authentication schemes are designed for the single-server environments and are not satisfied for users' requests. This paper proposes an efficient protocol for multi-server architecture with more security procedure. The computation cost, security, and efficiency of our scheme are well suited to the practical applications.
Intrdouction
In recent years, since the rapid growth of Internet technologies, more and more servers provide different resources to be accessed over the open network. For most of the resources provided by remote servers, users must pass an authentication procedure in order to access data and receive authorization. Remote user authentication scheme allows a server to check the legitimacy of a remote user through insecure communication channel. In 1981, Lamport proposed a remote user authentication scheme [3] based on verifier table, but this scheme is vulnerable to stolen verifier attack. Since then many password authentication schemes using smart card have been proposed to improve the cost, efficiency, and security of the authentication mechanism [1] . However, these schemes are designed for the single-server architecture. They may not satisfy the users' requests if conventional password authentication methods are applied to multi-server environments. In practice, each user needs to login various remote servers repetitively and also need to remember different identifications and passwords for accessing different servers. Later, several papers have been devoted to the study of accessing the resources of multi-server environments [2, 5, 6] . Recently, Lee et al. have proposed a novel authentication protocol for multi-server architecture without smart cards [4] . Their protocol is novel and attempts to provide an efficient and secure password authentication protocol without smart cards that can resist all kinds of malicious attacks. Unfortunately, we find that Lee et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to an insider's attack and a stolen verifier attack. To remedy these flaws, this paper proposes an efficient improvement over Lee et al.'s scheme that inherits their merits and with more security. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 shows the details of the proposed scheme. Section 3 makes the security analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally, some concluding remarks are made in the last section.
The Proposed scheme
In this section, we propose a robust and secure authentication scheme for multiserver environment. The notations used in our scheme are summarized in Table 1 . The multi-server environment contains three participants, the user (U i ), the server (S j ) and the registration center (RC). First of all, it is assumed that RC is trustworthy. After each server is authorized, RC sends each of them a shared secret key V j = h(x, SID j ).
When the registration center RC permits the entry of a remote server Sj, RC uses SIDj to compute the shared secret key Vj= h(x, SIDj), and sends Vj to Sj via the secure channel. This shared key is used to confirm the legitimacy of the remote server and the registration center. Our scheme consists of four phases: Registration Phase, Login Phase and Authentication Phase. Different phases of work are described as follows:
This phase is invoked whenever a new user U i wants to access the resources of the remote servers, he has to submit his identity ID i and password PW i to the registration center RC through a secure channel for registration. The details are shown as the following steps.
Step R1: U i freely selects a password PW i and a random number r.
Step R2:
Step R3: RC computes TPW i =h(ID i ||x) ⊕h(r⊕PW i ), then stores it in its database.
Step R4: RC ⇒ U i : an accepted message.
Login Phase:
When U i wants to login the remote server S j , he keys his identity ID i , password PW i , r and then performs the following steps:
Step L1:
where a is a random number.
Step L2: Generate nonce N i , where the nonce N i used only once.
Step L3:
Authentication Phase:
Upon receiving the login request mes-
RC perform the following procedure to make them authorized.
Step V1:
S j generates a nonce N j and computes
Step V2: RC → S j : ID i , SID j , E V j (N j , g as mod p, E h(r ⊕ PW i ) (g bs mod p)).
Upon receiving the message sent by a mod p and uses SK to decrypt N ij . Next, U i computes E SK (h(N ij )) and sends it to S j .
Step V5: S j →U i : E SK (N i ). Upon receiving the message from U i , S j computes D SK (E SK (h(N ij ))) to retrieve Q = h(N ij ). Then, S j computes Q ' = h(N ij ) by using N ij generated in Step V3 and compares it with Q. If they are not equal, S j terminates this session; otherwise, S j computes E SK (N i ) and sends the computation result to U i .
Step V6: After getting the transmitted message, U i computes D SK (E SK (N i )) and checks if N i is in the decryption result for freshness checking. If it holds, the authentication is successful; otherwise, the connection is interrupted. After finishing mutual authentication, the user U i and the remote server S j can use the session key SK to encrypt/decrypt the secret information for the following communication.
Security analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security of our proposed scheme. Other parts of our work are same as the original Lee et al.'s scheme [5] .
Claim 1. The proposed scheme can resist the insider's attack.
Proof: In the registration phase of Lee et al.'s scheme, a user U i selects a random number r, password PW i and computes h(r⊕PW i ). He submits ID i and h(r⊕PW i ) to the registration center RC. If the insider of RC may try to use PW i to impersonate U i to login other servers outside of the system, he will fail. Since U i registers to RC by presenting h(r⊕PW i ) instead of PW i , the insider of RC cannot directly obtain PW i . Moreover, as r is not revealed to RC, the insider of RC cannot obtain PW i by performing an off-line guessing attack on h(r⊕PW i ). Hence, the improved scheme can resist the insider attack.
Claim 2. The proposed scheme can resist the stolen-verifier attack.
Proof: In the proposed scheme, the user U i 's authentication data stored in RC is TPW i = h(ID i ||x) ⊕ h(r ⊕ PW i ). Suppose that an adversary Eve has stolen the TPW i , she can obtain h(r ⊕ PW i ) only if Eve has the information of h(ID i ||x), which implies she knows RC's long-term secret key x. Since h(r ⊕ PW i ) is hidden in TPW i , and the secret key x is under strict protection as assumed, it is infeasible for Eve to obtain h(r ⊕ PW i ) in this way. In addition, if Eve is a legal user and has stolen her TPW e , it is still computational infeasible for Eve to retrieve x since h(.) is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. That is, our proposed scheme can resist the stolen-verifier attack.
Claim 3. The proposed scheme can resist the server spoofing attack and registration center spoofing.
Proof: If Eve is a legal user, she cannot impersonate as any remote server S j to cheat U i , since she cannot construct the session key SK without the knowledge of PW i , r. Even if Eve has stolen the TPW i , she cannot obtain h(r ⊕ PW i ) as mentioned above. Thus, Eve cannot decrypt the transmitted messages from some legal user. After communicating with the masqueraded remote server, the legal user can detect immediately and terminates the session. Hence, our improved scheme can protect the user from being cheated by the masqueraded remote server. Similarly, if Eve wishes to masquerade as the registration center to cheat the server, it is infeasible because each server S j has a V j =h(SID j , x). The server can use V j and a nonce N j to verify the registration center in Step V3 of the Authentication Phase.
Claim 4. The proposed scheme can resist the off-line password guessing attack.
Proof: Suppose an attacker Eve has the information of {h(r♁PW i )♁rc, h(h(r ♁PW i ))♁rs and h(SK, rc)}. Eve first can guess a password PW E to compute the corresponding h(PW E ) and then finds ru = ru♁h(r♁PW i )♁h(PW E ) and rs =rs♁h(r ♁PW i )♁h(PW E ). However, it is computationally infeasible, since Eve does not know ru, rs and SK. In addition, h(.) is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. Hence, even if Eve has guessed the correct password, she cannot verify her guess by analyzing the scheme messages over the network. Obviously, off-line guessing attacks cannot be performed on our proposed scheme.
Conclusions
We have shown that our proposed scheme can withstand various attacks. As compared to the Lee et al.'s scheme, the proposed scheme inherits their merits, enhances their security. Therefore, the proposed scheme is well suited to the practical applications environment. 
References

